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To Have and to Be: Sex, Gender, and the Paradox of Change
Abstract
The body is one locus of control in the organization of social life, a site upon which social order is maintained.
Within that order, a fundamental structure relies upon the radical dichotomization of, on the one hand, female
and male and, on the other, femininity and masculinity: gender is understood to be an immutable and
consistent distinction which is natural to sex' and therefore to the organization of bodies. In this paper, I take
three texts which address the mutability of both sex and gender through genital transformation. I suggest that
while these texts challenge the idea that sex and gender are both fixed, they also reinstate a precise relationship
between sex and gender, that is, between femaleness and femininity and maleness and masculinity. My main
focus is on Will Self 's paired novellas "Cock & Bull" (1992), where desires and anxieties about gender
mutation play out in a fictional setting. This is complemented by Garfinkel's (1967) presentation of "Agnes,"
an "intersexed" person, who goes through sex reassignment surgery, and Bornstein's "Gender Outlaw" (1994),
an autobiographical work on the same theme.
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To have and to be: Sex, gender, and the paradox of change 
Katherine Sender 
The body is one locus of control in the organization of social life, a site upon which 
social order is maintained. Within that order, a fundamental structure relies upon the 
radical dichotomization of, on the one hand, female and male and, on the other, 
femininity and masculinity: gender is understood to be an immutable and consistent 
distinction which is natural to sex' and therefore to the organization of bodies. In this 
paper, I take three texts which address the mutability of both sex and gender through 
genital transformation. I suggest that while these texts challenge the idea that sex and 
gender are both fixed, they also reinstate a precise relationship between sex and gender, 
that is, between femaleness and femininity and maleness and masculinity. My main focus 
is on Will Self's paired novellas "Cock & Bull" (1992), where desires and anxieties about 
gender mutation play out in a fictional setting. This is complemented by Garfinkel's 
(1967) presentation of "Agnes," an "intersexed" person, who goes through sex 
reassignment surgery, and Bornstein's "Gender Outlaw" (1994), an autobiographical 
work on the same theme. 
Foucault (1973, 1978) has argued that the body has been successively reined into an 
increasingly organized - and organizing - system of discourses, including "demography, 
biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism" 
(1978, p.33) since the eighteenth century. The consideration of the role of the body in the 
social construction of gender has also been a prevailing concern in feminist theory, 
including in recent works by Butler (1990, 1993), Garber (1993), and Grosz (1994), 
amongst many others. Each of these authors challenge essentialized notions of the body: 
for example Grosz argues that "it is not simply that the body is represented in a variety of 
ways according to historical, social, and cultural exigencies while it remains basically the 
same; these factors actively produce the body as a body of a determinate type" including 
"culturally, sexually, racially specific bodies..." (p. x-xi, emphasis added). 
In her work on cross-dressing, Garber celebrates a range of transvestite practices, arguing 
that between the dichotomies of masculine and feminine, the transvestite stands as a third 
figure, where "'third' is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility" 
(p. 11) which disrupts the cozy dualism of female and male, woman and man, girl and 
boy, and simultaneously challenges the idea of the unified "one," who possesses a 
coherent (sexual) subjectivity. From Garber's thesis, I suggest that it is precisely the 
sexual indeterminacy of the clothed body which necessitates the often rigidly-enforced 
distinctions of male and female attire: we need to know quickly and reliably who we are 
dealing with. Enforcing an obvious sexual distinction in dress - and, by extension, the 
body itself - is thus vitally important for maintaining a gender-dichotomized social order. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether transgressing the binary oppositions of sex and 
gender (either through cross-dressing or by changing the sexual characteristics of one's 
body) necessarily constitutes political resistance to that opposition. Alternatively, these 
transgressions may always be at risk of being recuperated within dominant discourses, 
through medicalizing, pathologizing or moralizing them. Nevertheless, defying the norms 
of sexual identification may be, for many, what allows for a tolerable, even pleasurable 
existence and, further, may also lead to structural transformations which allow for 
broader possibilities of individual sexual variation. Self: Spontaneous mutations of sex 
and gender The baby ... was of an age (about fourteen months), when each new morning 
represents nothing so much as a triumph on the part of the Continuity Department... [She] 
was delighted (albeit perplexed) that the actors playing her parents seemed to have 
remembered, once again, the parts assigned to them. (Self, 1992, p.157) 
The child here gives voice to a knowledge which is fundamentally contested in Self's 
paired novellas "Cock & Bull"; a knowledge that assumes a guaranteed continuity of the 
reassuring binaries of sexual difference. Despite appearances, "the parts assigned" to 
characters in the novellas are not constant; neither body parts nor social roles are reliably 
fixed. The first novella, "Cock," is a story told by a stranger to the narrator on a train. It 
opens with a statement that the heroine, Carol, had "always felt at some level less of a 
woman when Dan was around" (p.3), establishing a problematic around the theme of 
femininity and womanhood from its outset. Where Carol is insipid, spineless and lazy, 
her husband Dan is "slight, sour, effete, unsure of himself' (p. 9), afraid of his own and 
anyone else's sexuality; that is, he is less than a "man". Carol becomes increasingly 
dissatisfied with her life with the inadequate, alcoholic Dan and so stops drinking and 
starts masturbating. On one erotic self-exploration Carol finds a "frond" (p. 32) growing 
around her urethra: while alarmed, her response is to ignore it and hope it will disappear, 
"leaving her genitals pristine, smooth, a delight to find and find again, just as she had 
been doing in the few short weeks since she had discovered the joy of wanking" (p. 39). 
However, this frond develops rapidly into a penis, which Carol initially finds repulsive. 
"How one becomes what one is" (Chapter 6) describes Carol's journey into phallic 
potency. As her penis grows and responds to arousal by becoming erect, her personality 
develops in tandem: she gains an increasing sense of empowerment in the world, and 
"along with this came a velcro wrenching as the little hooks of Carol's will began to pull 
away from the little restraining loops of Carol's conscience" (p.77). She begins to prefer 
the company of men, and while she knows "that her penis didn't make her a man ... it did 
free her a little bit more from being anything else, it did unslip those surly bonds and 
surly girly locks" (p. 81). Thus Carol welcomes liberation from what is depicted as an 
inevitably whining, manipulative, weak-willed but ultimately ethical (though in the most 
passive conception of the word) state of femininity. The state of womanhood, as depicted 
in "Cock" is one to be escaped, if at all possible. 
Carol increasingly enjoys her developing penis, prancing and posturing before a mirror. 
She begins to perceive her mutation as an enhancement which cannot remain solitary: she 
wants to utterly dominate Dan. She seduces him into drinking again, drugs him, throws 
him on the bed and rapes him. This is the "confirmation of what she truly was ... Crass 
isn't it? The idea that being able to fuck Dan, actually penetrate him somehow made 
Carol aggressive, made her a rapist ... Crass, but true" (p. 128). Dan dies from alcohol 
poisoning and head injuries; in a spiteful, manipulative and immoral resolution, Carol 
frames their holier-than-thou Alcoholics Anonymous buddy for the rape and murder of 
her husband. 
At the climax of the tale, the strange storyteller triumphantly declares that he/she is Carol, 
who, having been through "such a splendidly original and entire metamorphosis [is] well-
placed for further theatricals" (p. 138) and proceeds to rape the narrator. In time with his 
thrusting into the narrator Carol asks "Do-you-seek-to- rearrange-things?" (p. 143) 
raising the questions of who is rearranging what: Carol's sex and gender are rearranged, 
as are her power relations with the narrator. Invoking "rearrangement" implies that there 
is a natural order of things which, ironically, Carol's physical being has already violated. 
The narrator's subject position is feminized through rape and insults, and he feels that to 
go to the police would invite aspersions concerning his dress, his sexual orientation, and 
his foolishness in venturing out "into the fictional night alone" (p. 144). So in "Cock: a 
novelette" we are presented with a woman who becomes male, who rapes a man who is 
feminized by the scenario: the story thus contains multiple disruptions across sex/body 
and gender/subjectivity polarities, troubling the reassurances of each. 
In Self's second novella, "Bull: a farce", we are presented with the rugged, 
hypermasculine, rugby playing, beer drinking though sexually insecure protagonist, 
ironically named "Bull," who develops a rogue vagina overnight in the pit of his knee. 
We are given no explanation for this, except the preposterous notion that it could have 
been caused by the joke of the genitalia- obsessed comedian, Razza Rob ("'Whaddya call 
a man with a count in the back of his leg?' ... `Fucked if I know, but any port in a storm, 
eh, old chep?"' [p. 1701]) Bull consults his doctor, Alan Margoulies, for a diagnosis of 
the wound or infection he initially believes his new genitals to be. The sexually attractive, 
somewhat effeminate, self- important doctor is a "dedicated truffler" (p. 163-4), in 
constant search of an idealized "warm young snatch ... that had yet to be punched from 
within by a baby's head" (p. 164), which categorically excludes his wife's. Bull has a 
simultaneously pragmatic and childlike faith in medicine and doctors: he has a desperate 
need for diagnosis and "getting the appropriate treatment" (p.187). Alan "reveals" the 
truth of Bull's vagina to him, but only when the former's desire to fuck Bull has made 
itself all too clear to the doctor's consciousness. Alan's seduction of Bull at a moment 
when the latter wants "the dry, sensible touch of a doctor" (p. 230) is presented as a 
compulsive but self- conscious transgression of medical ethics, and leads to an ongoing 
affair which is broken only when Alan (inevitably) goes back to his wife, once the 
novelty of Bull's vagina wears off. 
Bull is described as becoming increasingly feminine, without consciousness or volition, 
throughout the tale. When Alan "diagnoses" Bull's vagina, Bull understood it all. 
Understood the feelings of vulnerability that had been troubling him all day; understood 
the difficulties he had had in analysing the sensations that the wound, or burn, had 
provoked in him; understood Alan's behavior in the health centre. But worse, far worse, 
Bull understood certain deep and painful things about himself that had always shamed 
him. (p 227) 
Thus the fragilities of and ruptures within Bull's robust masculinity are revealed to him in 
that moment. This is confirmed by the experience of being fucked by Alan as both 
emasculating and strangely pleasurable: Bull felt violated, traduced, seduced, 
bamboozled, subjugated, entrapped and enfolded. He felt his capacity for action 
surgically removed. He felt, for the first time in his life, that his sense of himself as a 
purposeful automaton, striding on the world's stage, had been vitiated by a warm wash of 
transcendence. (p. 234) 
Afterwards, Bull feels for Alan, not love, but dependency. His subsequent depression and 
needy machinations about the possibilities of a continuing affair with Alan turn out to be 
symptoms of pre-menstrual syndrome, confirming that Bull's female "apparatus" is fully 
functional. Bull struggles with the integration of the knowledge of his "radically 
independent gender" (p. 276). Faced with two disembodied model legs - one in a sports 
shop, the other in a neighboring pharmacy - Bull notices that where one is coded as 
masculine, "poised and virile" (p. 260), surrounded by "trusses, socks, workmanlike 
garters, headbands, shirts, shorts and more socks" (p. 261), the other "was a sales display 
for tights and other feminine impedimenta" (p. 260). Bull asks himself "But which one is 
mine ... Who am I?" (p. 261). The answer, of course, is neither, since on the one hand the 
masculine integrity of his male leg has been compromised by the appearance of female 
genitals and on the other hand his leg is not female either, because the feminization of his 
body "marks" the very leg itself, which is supposed to be sexually encoded by other 
means, by appropriately "feminine impedimenta." 
On later discovering his pregnancy, Bull does not commit suicide, as implied, but 
displays surprising resilience which, ironically, is a result of his increasing femininity, 
and goes to San Francisco to have "his and Alan's love-child" (p. 309). This is a boy, with 
whom Bull settles down in Wales, running a sports and memorabilia shop, the 
merchandise of which perhaps alludes to the remaining combination of masculinity 
(sports) and femininity (memorabilia). Bull is ultimately recuperated into normality, and 
while there is no mention of genital resolution, he remains, or becomes again, a man. 
Both "Cock" and "Bull" challenge the fixity of sex and gender, but to what extent does 
this compromise essentialist notions of femininity and masculinity? While the stories 
represent mutations or developments of genitals independent of an "original" sex, both 
insist on some identity or temperamental features which correspond to the physical 
change. This implies an essentialist model: while the body may change, challenging the 
idea that sex is given, fixed and lifelong, the psyche must necessarily change in tandem 
with the defining sexual characteristics, suggesting a natural correspondence between 
body and subjectivity. Even in Bull's case, where his vagina need not compromise his 
still-intact penis, it is his blossoming femininity which achieves ascendancy. And while 
his increasing feminization is represented as a weakness, it is also shown ultimately to 
have done him good, compared with Carol's malevolent masculinity. Thus, not only is 
femininity yoked with the vagina and masculinity with the penis, these characteristics are 
doubly encoded with a moral value: femininity necessarily induces gentleness, and 
masculinity an amoral will to dominate. However, in terms of the subjective self-esteem 
of the characters, Self implies that masculinity is an enhancement, an empowerment, 
even if it is a destructive, immoral one; femininity threatens masculine integrity, and as 
such is a diminishment of the self, even while it has a socially integrating effect. 
Along with the representation of genitals as having some necessary psychic 
correspondence, issues of masculinity and femininity are also closely allied with 
homosexuality. In "Cock," Carol had a somewhat unsavory lesbian relationship prior to, 
and within, her marriage to Dan. As a "man" Carol seems to have a fascination with and 
desire for gay sex (specifically buggery) even while she/he includes homosexuals in a list 
of hated groups. Her/his homoerotic experiences both as a woman and as a "man" 
inscribe her/him as doubly, inversely transgressive, first as a lesbian and secondly as a 
gay "man." Bull, alternatively, is initially represented as relentlessly heterosexual, but in 
the crisis of realizing his feminizing predicament, reconsiders his history as he "joined 
the dots of memory and saw the sketchy picture of his latent femininity emerge from a 
myriad of locker-room blushes and missed emotional connections..." (p. 228). In sexual 
relations with Alan, Bull is profoundly feminized, and while the homoerotic component 
of this sex is (guiltily) enjoyed by both, it is suppressed beneath the normalcy of 
"heterosexual" intercourse between them. 
Overall, Self's exploration of sex and gender mutability is not a utopian dream of equality 
and wholeness, it is instead a world of perversity, duplicity and moral compromise. His 
characters do not transcend the narrow limits of ascribed sex and gender to achieve a 
liberated state of human wholeness; rather, one set of gender limitations are replaced or, 
at least, modified by a second, equally limited array of possibilities. As such, his novellas 
raise questions about what a representation of an idyllic non-gender-limited human may 
look like, by suggesting that alongside a fantasy of a non-gendered society lies a reality 
of an, arguably, inherently alienated, gender dichotomized, sex-divided social structure. 
"Agnes" and Bornstein: Testimonies of lived experience 
It would be possible to argue that the contradictions and recuperations of Self's novellas 
are a product of his working within a literary genre. However, two accounts of lived 
experiences (from very different historical moments and perspectives) raise similar 
contradictions around the conundrum of mutable sex and gender. The first (Garfinkel, 
1967) documents the case of "Agnes," who applied for sex reassignment surgery at 
UCLA to make her a "real" woman; the second is an autobiographical account by a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual and political activist (Bornstein, 1994). Agnes is "a 
nineteen- year-old girl raised as a boy whose female measurements of 38-25-38 were 
accompanied by a fully developed penis and scrotum" (p. 117).' Garfinkel argues that the 
cultural ascription of gender is "rigorously dichotomized into the 'natural,' ie. moral, 
entities of male and female" (p. 116, emphasis in the original). Transgressions of that 
dichotomy are thus regarded as immoral acts, in and of themselves; that immorality must 
therefore be included in the society's perception of the person, who will consequently be 
punished. Garfinkel is concerned to allow the benevolent hand of psychiatry and 
medicine both to help unfortunate transsexuals to reassimilate into society as their chosen 
gender, and to educate broader society towards greater tolerance. 
Using Agnes' case, Garfinkel attempts to show that "passing," where the transsexual aims 
to maintain a coherent public persona as their "elected sex status" (p. 118), requires 
constant effort to sustain because of the "omnirelevance of sexual statuses to affairs of 
daily life as an invariant but unnoticed background in the texture of relevances that 
comprise the changing actual scenes of everyday life." (p. 118) The effort of passing 
meant that Agnes "was self-consciously equipped to teach normals how normals make 
sexuality happen in commonplace settings as an obvious, familiar, recognizable, natural, 
and serious matter of fact" (p. 186, emphasis added). Agnes, therefore, is in a unique 
position to recognize - and perform - "appropriately" sexed social behavior. However, 
neither Agnes nor Garfinkel address the ontological issues of gender identity; both fail to 
address where Agnes' sexual identity may originate, and instead choose to trust the 
"evidence" of her "large, well-developed breasts" (p. 119) as proof enough of her 
femininity. Agnes reportedly saw her case as one of "natural error" (p. 127) which 
surgeons could quite legitimately repair: in her view, she was entitled to a vagina, since 
nature had swindled her out of one. She valued her breasts as "essential insignia" of 
femaleness and was adamant that she had "always been a girl" (p. 128). Garfinkel 
emphasizes that Agnes' hyperfemininity was not a choice, in that Agnes was not able to 
switch gender roles with any ease (let alone desire). He concludes that while there was no 
"natural" feminine identity to accompany Agnes' "essential insignia" of femaleness 
(breasts), only by knowing and practicing the "art" of femininity in a coherent, stable and 
credible way, can the impression of femaleness be managed in the outside world. 
Bornstein (1994) provides a very different account from Garfinkel's of the choice to 
disrupt the gender identity ascribed to morphological sex: declared a boy at birth, she 
struggled with this ascription for thirty years, and ultimately underwent male-to-female 
transsexual surgery. In contrast to Agnes, whose concern was to pass as a "real" woman 
as convincingly as possible, Bornstein's project is to use her body as a site upon which to 
challenge the assumptions about the natural immutabilities of gender at both the physical 
and subjective levels. She argues that "there are as many truthful experiences of gender as 
there are people who think they have a gender" (p. 8), raising the question of what it 
might mean to be, or identify as, a man or a woman. "I know I am not a man - about that 
much I am very clear, and I've come to the conclusion that I am probably not a woman 
either, at least not according to a lot of people's rules on this sort of thing" (p. 8). 
Contrasting with Agnes' concern with successfully passing, Bornstein perceives her self-
representation prior to her sex reassignment surgery as marked by lies and secrets, and 
her change of sex as an act of honesty. On deciding to undertake the surgery she was 
advised to make up a past as a little girl in order to present a credible persona to the world 
as an "authentic" woman. "Here I was, taking a giant step toward personal integrity by 
entering therapy with the truth and self-acknowledgment that I was transsexual, and I was 
told 'don't tell anyone you're a transsexual"' (p. 62). Bornstein was committed to avoiding 
the safe resolution of passing as a "real" woman; from the time of her conversion, her 
project was to exist in a space of not-male, of challenging the very notion of both 
maleness and femaleness, of masculinity and femininity, by eluding recruitment into 
either camp. 
Bornstein is thus concerned to radically dislocate sex, gender and the apparent 
naturalness of difference. A paradox in her work, however, is this: if there is no necessary 
correspondence between gender and bodily sex, did she need to have surgery in order to 
divest herself of an identification with maleness? If one can invest one's identity with 
qualities of femininity and masculinity (or even qualities which are yoked to neither 
polarity) irrespective of genitalia, surely it would not matter whether Bornstein continued 
to possess a penis. When asked this at a lecture at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst, she responded that although she had enjoyed having a penis, she wanted to 
know what it was like to have a vagina; what was surgically possible she then chose, 
rather than using the rationalization of needing surgery to rectify "natural error" of being 
a "woman trapped in a man's body". Secondly, she implied that while she had a penis she 
could not know what it was like to be without one. But this turns us back to a potentially 
essentialist binarism: it seems that it would not have been possible for Bornstein to have 
both a vagina and a penis, and still experience herself as not-male. At the level of the 
body, it seems, one still needs to choose one's sex: we may transgress across the 
boundary from one to the other, but cannot remain equally situated in each, or neither, 
sex. "S/he" may be a linguistic possibility, but not a bodily one, at least not yet. Sexual 
subjectivities: problems and possibilities 
In the works of Self, Garfinkel and Bornstein, we thus have not one fictional 
representation of gender change and two real ones, but three different struggles with the 
complex relations between sex and gender. In Self's "Cock & Bull" we are presented with 
two (more or less) innocent victims of a particularly perverse natural disaster, which 
profoundly destablilizes the gendered subjectivity of each character, though 
(interestingly) not only as a result of interactions with the outside world (both Carol and 
Bull pass without too many problems) but rather, as an inherent result of their shifting 
biological, sexual reality. The relationship between sexed genitals and masculinity or 
femininity is presented as straightforward: one becomes what one "naturally" is, where 
natural is defined by genitals, even those in a far-from-conventional place on the body. 
This contrasts with the work of Garfinkel (1967) and Bornstein (1994), where the 
relationship between the body and identity is far more problematic. Bornstein, in 
particular, presents a radical constructionist model of identity, arguing that there is no 
necessary correspondence between physical and psychic gender. Both Bornstein and 
Garfinkel fail to address, however, what it means to reject the physical manifestations of 
a sexed self; why is the body experienced as anathema to psychic reality? While there 
may not be any natural correspondence between sex and gender, given the absolute 
distinctions made in our culture between the binary opposites of the feminine female and 
the masculine male, the only routes available to Agnes and Bornstein, as well as Self's 
protagonists, was to maintain an integrity between the physical and the psychic, that is, 
between sex and gender. 
In both essentialist and constructionist analyses of gender, the relationship implied 
between identity and the body is that the body accurately reflects the sexed identity, 
whether this reflection is "natural" or a fabrication necessary in order to function in a sex-
dichotomized culture. This does not address the question of "'core gender identity"' 
(Garber p. 101), either in relation to transsexuals or, importantly, in a wider cultural 
context: "is their [transsexuals'] gendered subjectivity mimicry, or a 'real one'? What 
would 'real' and 'mimic' mean in the cultural milieu in which all gender roles are 
constructed?" (Garber, 1992, p. 101). Garber argues that discourses which endorse 
surgery and hormone treatment as "'solutions' to gender undecidability" (p. 102) 
effectively function as a "new essentialism" (p. 108) where the body is changed to fix 
gender - here "fix" implies both to "make right" and to "make stable". Indeed, Irvine 
(1990) argues that in a post-1960s era of increasing flexibility of gender roles, with its 
accompanying anxieties, the medico- psychiatric category "transsexualism" has gained 
popularity and sex reassignment surgery has become routine. The creation of "gender 
dysphoria" as diagnosable disorder "allow[s] for the distancing of cultural conflict and 
signaled that gender diversity was not a collective problem requiring society to confront 
rigid stereotypes and inequality; it was the dilemma of individuals with a dysfunction" (p. 
260). 
Similarly, Kotz (1992) introduces Judith Butler as someone who both argues that gender 
transgressions can be profoundly subversive, but "at the same time cautions against 
understanding the realm of fantasy and representation as a 'domain of psychic free play' 
unencumbered by relations of social power" (p. 82). Butler rejects readings of her work, 
"Gender Trouble" (1990), which interpret gender performance as a kind of consumerism, 
where any choice is available to anyone at any time. Gender is not a free choice, in that 
"the very formation of subjects, the very formation of persons, presupposes gender..." (p. 
84, emphasis in original). She argues that challenging the supposed fixities of gender by 
mimicking heterosexual conventions through cross- dressing or role play is not 
necessarily a political act; "for a copy to be subversive of heterosexual hegemony it has 
to both mime and displace its conventions" (p. 84, emphasis added). She uses the 
example of Livingston's film "Paris is Burning" (1991) to show how the actions and 
aspirations of the young disenfranchised male transvestites potentially both reinvest 
gender ideals and endorse their hegemonic power. 
In resisting notions of the naturalness of gender, that is, inevitable forms of social and 
sexual behavior which depend upon an unproblematic notion of biological sex, 
transsexuals may challenge the constructedness of gender identities, inviting others to 
engage with the artifactual status of gender. However, this raises significant questions 
regarding the political status of transsexualism: on the one hand, some transsexuals may 
seek allegiances with transvestites and others involved in the political action of 
"genderfuck"; on the other hand, the underlying disparity between physical sex and the 
subjectively sexed "self' which transsexuals (in many cases) seek to resolve through sex 
reassignment surgery, may reinstate a notion of essential sexual identity. This paradox, 
therefore, arises between the liberatory and the normative potentials of transsexualism in 
relation to ideas of "natural" sex difference and appropriate sexual socialization.As long 
as two sexes are ascribed unique and exclusive genders, the need to transgress their 
division will be necessary, if not, in certain circumstances, encouraged. While the 
sex/gender alliance is so rigidly enforced, disciplining discourses such as medicine, 
psychiatry and sexology would rather endorse a "natural" integrity of the body in order to 
maintain a consistent, even though (surgically) constructed, association between female 
and feminine, and male and masculine. However, at least theoretically, it would be 
possible to conceptualize a model in which such extreme and risky procedures would not 
even be relevant. Grosz(1994) argues that "bodies can be represented or understood not 
as entities in themselves or simply on a linear continuum with its polar extremes occupied 
by male and female bodies (with the various gradations of the 'intersexed' individuals in 
between) but as a field, a two dimensional continuum in which race (and possibly even 
class, caste, or religion) form body specifications...." (p. 19-20). Grosz, therefore, 
attempts to dislocate binary oppositions of gender, instead situating bodies in complex, 
multilayered systems of constitution which allow for greater diversity and flexibility.' 
This disruption of systems of bodily organization could be compatible with Foucault's 
(1978) aspirations for sexualities which shift existing power relations. If dominant 
discursive practices currently control people within the social body across gender (among 
other) divisions, in part through the regulation of desire and sexuality, dismantling some 
of those divisions may also necessitate exploring different notions of pleasure. Perhaps 
this would be compatible with Foucault's call to arms to counter the grips of power with 
the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility 
of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality 
ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. (p.157) 
It may be possible to envision a state of affairs where sex and gender are not indissolubly 
joined; where both could be conceived of as mutable and relational; where sexual 
possibilities would be defined, not by opposites, but according to a more fluid idea of 
sexual variation; and where the pleasures of the body would not necessarily be yoked to 
currently enforced and eroticized sexual practices. While this type of sexual anarchy has 
its appeals, it also poses daunting challenges to some our most precious identities: those 
of us who identify as lesbian, gay or heterosexual would have some rethinking to do. It 
also potentially threatens the premises of much feminist analysis which relies upon 
tangible, identifiable differences (albeit constructed ones) in both sex and gender as a 
basis for theory. What would it mean to be a feminist in a post-gendered world? To what 
would we turn to structure an analysis of power? If Butler's (1993) premise that 
subjectivity itself is predicated upon gender (and thus, I would add, a consistent 
relationship with sex), it is difficult to imagine from what stuff the sense of self would be 
made. Or would the western notion of `the self' as a logocentric, individualized and 
solitary entity (Chang, 1996) also be forced to change? 
The consistency of the relationship between sex and gender in the accounts of Self, 
Garfinkel and Bornstein - even despite the gap in time and political developments 
between them - attests perhaps to an ongoing attachment to the comforts of the sexual 
order, even while we lament its strictures. Perhaps the dark humor of Self's "Cock & 
Bull" reminds us that the psychic and social determinations of gender remain irresistible, 
even when the possibilities of the sexed body are, in theory, open. Notes 
1. Throughout this paper, I use "sex" and "gender" as distinct terms, where "sex" refers to 
a naming of babies at birth, as female or male, according to their possession of a vulva or 
penis. In the case of babies with indistinct genitals, the ascribed sex corresponds to the 
form the genitals are surgically "resolved" to be. "Gender," alternatively, refers to the 
social and behavioral qualities which are tied to ascribed sex and which we most 
familiarly refer to as femininity and masculinity. 
2. It is interesting to note that alongside the perverse mutability of gender in "Cock and 
Bull," race remains fixed: this suggests a greater comfort with - and erotic potential of - 
fantasizing gender shifts in a way that comparable shifts arcs racial lines would present 
far too great a threat to the status quo of white privilege. 
3. Note the way of marking Agnes' body as feminine, that is, by invoking the "vital 
statistics" of beauty pageants. 
4. In the appendix to this chapter, Garfinkel related that a number of years after Agnes' 
surgery, she revisited the UCLA clinic and "with the greatest of casualness" (p. 287) 
revealed that she had taken her mother's estrogen pills from age twelve, which had given 
her the secondary sexual characteristics of a female and suppressed the development of 
male secondary characteristics. 
5. A less delimited system of social relations potentially produces a fragmentation of 
groups who may otherwise organize as political allies around broader agenda (e.g. 
feminism, lesbian and gay activism, and so on). While this may be a risk, it could also be 
argued that the rigid demarcations of gender, race, class, sexuality and age, among others, 
is ultimately more fragmenting and alienating than a more fluid model of identity and 
belonging could ever be. References 
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